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I. Introduction and Summary of Conclusions
Fair Trial Observers (FTOs) have been used in numerous international cases in one
form or another for quote some time, dating back as early as 1498. Since the end of
World War II, FTOs have become more mainstream and more accepted as part of the
framework of customary international law. Initially, trial observers were often diplomats
or consuls who would observe trials of particular importance or political interest.
However, the most recent and now predominant form of FTO has been dispatched from
politically unbiased nongovernmental organizations (NGOs).
This memo addresses the issues posed by the OTP, but also divides the questions
further. In analyzing the use of FTOs in previous trials and in trials that likely would
have benefited from the presence of an FTO, a distinction must be made between trials
concerning war crimes that are conducted by tribunals in the aftermath of war or other
armed conflict,1 and domestic trials that concern all aspects of international criminal law.
Some of these non-international trials discussed in the memorandum include SaccoVanzetti, Castillo-Petruzzi, Abdullah Öcalan, and the Pan Am Flight 103. In the latter
type of cases, observers or FTOs were usually dispatched to the trials. In the former, they
were not. While observers may have witnessed the Nuremberg Tribunals, the ICTY, or
the ICTR, they were not represented as FTOs. A further distinction must be made
between a formal observer who is there to ensure that there is a fair trial and has stated
such intentions, and anyone else who observes a trial.
FTOs play the role of not only witnessing a trial, but doing so with a discerning legal
eye. A news agency or even a foreign government official may do a fine job of relaying
1

There is a slight exception to this statement as Yamashita was captured before the Japanese surrendered in
World War II and thus tried before a military tribunal rather than a special international tribunal.
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the basic happenings of a trial to the outside world. An FTO, however, takes simple
observation to a higher level by applying legal know-how and training to the analysis of
the fairness of a trial that would otherwise be missing. Further, an FTO would be free of
the bias often associated with members of the press or of governments. The ICTR has a
unique opportunity to possibly create a new norm of customary international law
concerning trial observers. If the Tribunal decides to employ FTOs of its own volition, it
will be the first international criminal tribunal to do so. In so doing, it has a chance to
deflect large amounts of criticism and allegations of unfairness by employing an impartial
mechanism for evaluating the fairness of its own trials.
On the other hand, the Tribunal will also increase the already high level of scrutiny
under which it operates. An existing slim margin for error will become even slimmer, as
mistakes will be picked apart and put on display almost immediately after a trial. Also,
there is little chance that the world outside of the ICTR will accept the word of FTOs as
completely impartial, no matter how impartial they actually are. There will always be
criticism of the Tribunal, no matter what. The question comes down to this: Would the
possible benefits of employing FTOs at the ICTR outweigh the drawbacks?
A. Issues
This memorandum addresses what role “Fair Trial Observers” should play in
international criminal law trials. It also discusses the role of observers in other high
profile trials and proposes guidelines for International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda
(“ICTR”) FTOs. The first part of this memorandum discusses: (1) what a fair trial is, (2)
what an FTO and his/ her role is, and (3) when an FTO should be used. The second part
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of this memorandum discusses the role of FTOs in other high profile trials. The third part
sets forth proposed guidelines for ICTR FTOs.
B. Summary of Conclusions
(1) Is there a role for FTOs in International Criminal Law Trials?
The answer to this question is yes, and with increasing frequency. FTOs are a useful
tool not only to make sure that a trial is conducted fairly, but also for a sending authority
to let the court in question know that it is being watched. In the context of the ICTR, the
world will know that the ICTR is policing itself, and that it is doing everything it can to
assure a fair trial, by employing FTOs.
(2) Discussion of Observers in other high profile trials.
FTOs have only to date been used in non-international trials. However, they are most
often used in domestic trials that have garnered international interest. Although it has not
been done before, FTOs used in international courts such as the ICTR could serve as a
safeguard against charges of unfairness and claims of victor’s justice.
(3) Proposed Guidelines for ICTR Fair Trial Observers.
The proposed guidelines are a compilation of guidelines from several NGOs drawing
mainly on the work of David Weissbrodt. There are specific changes that apply to the
ICTR in each proposed guidline.
The ICTR should strongly consider soliciting FTOs to observe all of its trials. Doing
so would give another assurance that the tribunal and its decisions cannot be as easily
attacked by revisionists and legal academia. Even trials that have taken the utmost
precautions to be fair, such those of Tadic and Milosevic, have come under a hail of
criticism. Although FTOs may not be the only answer to convincing the world that the
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proceedings of the ICTR are viewed as just by Rwanda and the rest of the world, they are
one powerful tool to preserve the legitimacy of the court presently and to preserve the
legacy of the court well into the future.
II.

Fair Trials
At the most basic level, a fair trial must conform to 3 things: (1) the laws of the

country in which the trial is being held,2 (2) the human rights treaties to which that
country is a party, and (3) norms of customary international law.3
The human rights treaties that apply are: the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights (ICCPR),4 which guarantees under Article 14 that “everyone shall be
entitled to a fair and public hearing by a competent, independent and impartial tribunal
established by law.” Also, Article 10 of the Universal Declaration on Human Rights
declares that, “everyone is entitled in full equality to a fair and public hearing . . . of any
criminal charge against him.”5 In addition to these treaties, the ICTR in particular is
bound by Article 7 of the African (Banjul) Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights,6

2

In the case of the ICTR, the laws must adhere to the ICTR’s Statute and its Rules of Procedure.
[Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 1]

3

Lawyer’s Committee for Human Rights, What is a Fair Trial? A Practical Guide to Legal Standards and
Practice, (2000). [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 27-c] The author uses the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 5-b] as part of
his basis for the guarantee of a fair trial. The author also uses the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights (ICCPR) [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 4]. The most directly relevant
articles of the UDHR are 5, 9, 10, and 11. Lastly, the author draws on the Convention for the Protection of
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Council of Europe. [Reproduced in the accompanying
notebook at Tab 3]
4
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, UN General Assembly resolution 2200A (XXI),
December 16, 1966, entered into force March 23, 1976. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab
4]
5

UDHR, supra note 3, Art. 10.

6

African [Banjul] Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, adopted June 27, 1981, OAU Doc.
CAB/LEG/67/3 rev. 5, 21 I.L.M. 59 (1982), entered into force Oct. 21, 1986. Art. 3, 7. [Reproduced in the
accompanying notebook at Tab 5-a]

4

which enumerates the following rights. The rights of the accused are enumerated in a
compilation of the above mentioned treaties and charters by the Lawyers Committee for
Human Rights.7

7

Lawyers Committee for Human Rights, note 3 supra.

“PRE-TRIAL RIGHTS
1. Prohibition on arbitrary arrest and detention
2. Right to know reasons for arrest (and any charges)
3. Right to legal counsel
4. Right to a prompt appearance before a judge to challenge the lawfulness of arrest and
detention
“Article 9(3) of the ICCPR makes it clear that pre-trial detention shall
not be the general rule and that that detainees should have some legitimate chance to post
bail or for some other reasonable guarantee of appearance at trial.”
5. The prohibition of torture and the right to humane conditions during pre-trial detention
6. Prohibition on incommunicado detention (should have the right to see family, lawyer,
doctor)
“THE HEARING: See Article 14 of the ICCPR
7. Equal access to, and equality before, the courts.
8. Right to a fair hearing. (keep each side of procedurally equal footing)
9. Right to a public hearing, subject to exceptions of Article 14(1).
10. Right to a competent, independent and impartial tribunal established by law in order with
14(1).
i.
Independence from external factors; It is important to keep the
judiciary independent from the executive and legislative powers.
ii.
Impartiality on the part of the court itself; if there is any question as to
the judge’s motives or impartiality, generally.
a. The right to a presumption of innocence.
b. The right to prompt notice of the nature and cause of criminal
charges: ICCPR Article 14(3).
c. The right to adequate time and facilities for the preparation of a
defense.
d. The right to a trial without undue delay.
e. The right to defend oneself in person or through legal counsel
ICCPR Article 14(3)(d).
f. The right to examine witnesses.
g. The right to an interpreter.
h. The prohibition on self-incrimination.
i. The prohibition on retroactive application of criminal laws.
j. The prohibition on double jeopardy.
iii.

POST-TRIAL RIGHTS
a. The right to appeal: ICCPR Art 14(5).
b. The right to compensation for miscarriage of justice.”

5

The ICTR, in order to maintain and improve its reputation with regard to fair
trials, should everything within its power to uphold the ideals and requirements as set
forth in the ICCPR, UDHR, European Convention, African Charter, etc.
A. What is the significance of a Fair Trial?
International criminal trials serve many purposes. Aside from the primary goal of
exacting and unbiased justice, there are legion secondary goals and ancillary benefits to
having such trials. As written by Jose A. Alvarez, on the purpose of international
criminal trials:
properly conducted international criminal trials, brought by and on behalf
of the international community, would: threaten those in positions of
power to deter further violence; make possible atonement for the
perpetrators and honor the dead; provide a mechanism to enable victims
and their families to receive needed psychological relief, identify remains,
restore lost property, and otherwise help heal wounds, channel victims’
thirst for revenge toward peaceful dispute settlement; affirm the
Nuremberg Principles at the international level while restoring faith in the
rule of law generally; tell the truth of what occurred, thereby preserving an
accurate historical account of barbarism that would prevent its recurrence;
and, perhaps most important, restore the lost civility of torn societies to
achieve national reconciliation.8
In following the above stated goals, it is important that the ICTR take every step possible
to deflect any possible claims of “victor’s justice.”9
B. History of “Fair Trial Observers”
There is ample precedent for the use of trial observers, historically and also in modern
times. The use of trial observers dates back to the trial of Alfred Dreyfus in 1899.10

8

Jose E. Alvarez, Rush to Closure: Lessons of the Tadic Judgment, 96 Mich. L. Rev. 2031, 2031-32 (year).
Alvarez distills the goals most frequently articulated by those who have established, administered, and
witnessed special Tribunals. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 15]

9

“Victor’s Justice” is simply the idea that war crimes tribunals have the potential to be nothing more than a
tool to further vanquish the defeated side of a military conflict while propping up the victor.
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Dreyfus’ prosecutors used a slew of unproven forensic techniques, conditionally relevant
evidence, and most disturbingly, some extremely fuzzy math.11 This trial drew so much
negative attention that the Queen of England sent her Chief Justice to observe its
fairness.12 Dreyfus was ultimately pardoned, largely because of the tremendous amount
of criticism, both domestic and international, that the French government received.13
There are even earlier instances of observers being sent to observe trials than Dreyfus.14
As of 1982,15 it was common practice for governments to send trial observers to foreign
trials of political or human rights significance.16 Governments often send observers to
foreign trials that involve their nationals.17 Military officials also often send observers to
trials of their personnel charged with criminal offenses abroad.18 Various treaties,
conventions, and precedent give countries standing to send observers to trials in foreign
countries.19 One of the most famous cases where a country sent observers was the Sacco-

10

David Weissbrodt, International Trial Observers, 18 Stan. J. Int’l L. (1982). Professor Weissbrodt is
citing Laurence H. Tribe, Trial by Mathematics: Precision and Ritual in the Legal Process, 84 HVLR
1329, 1332. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 9]
11

Id.

12

Weissbrodt, supra note 10, at 29.

13

Id. at 30.

14

Id. at 29. Weissbrodt cites trials where observers were sent dating back to 1498.

15

Although his article was written in 1982, it is still the leading academic authority on FTOs.

16

Weissbrodt, supra note 10, at 27. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at tab 9]

17

Id. at 28.

18

Id.

19

Id. Weissbrodt cites the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, which gives countries the legal right
to observe the trials of their nationals in foreign countries.
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Venzetti20 case, where the Italian consul to the United States attended the trial.
“Distinguished private observers” were sent by progressive organizations in the United
States and Great Britain.21 A Soviet trial in 1933 also drew international attention where
several British engineers were accused of espionage, bribery, and ‘wrecking.’22
After World War II, sending and receiving nongovernmental trial observers began to
become much more common.23 Observers were sent to trials all over the world.24 Of
particular interest is the Poznan trial, where Polish authorities invited trial observers to a
politically charged trial.25 NGOs began to send many more observers in the 1960s and

20

James A. Henretta, W. Elliot Brownlee, David Brody, Susan Ware, America’s History, Second Edition,
page 723, (1993). Sacco was a shoemaker and Bartolomeo Vanzetii a fish peddler in Massachusetts. They
were self proclaimed anarchists and Italian aliens who had evaded the draft. They were convicted in 1921
of robbery and murder. Regardless of their guilt or innocence, it is clear that they did not receive a fair trial
from the American judicial system. Shortly before his execution in 1927, Vanzetti claimed triumph, “If it
had not been for these thing, I might have live out my life among scorning men. I might have die,
unmarked, unknown, a failure. Now we are not failure. This is our career and our triumph. Never in our
full life can we hope to do such work for tolerance, for justice, for man’s understanding of man, as now we
do by an accident. Our words --- our lives --- our pains --- nothing! The taking of our lives --- lives of a
good shoemaker and a poor fish-peddlar --- all! That last moment belongs to us --- that agony is our
triumph.”
21

Weissbrodt, supra, footnote 10 citing, “Reich Opens Trial of Fire Suspects, N.Y. Times, Sept. 22, 1933,
at 1, col. 2; Reichstag Fire, Times of London, Sept. 21, 1933, at 12, col. 4. At 30. [Reproduced in the
accompanying notebook at Tab 9]

22

Id.

23

Id. at 31.

24

Id. Observers were sent to a 1949 Smith Act trial in the United States and to an important political trial in
Spain.
25

Weissbrodt, supra note 10 at 31. The International Commission of Jurists nominated four distinguished
lawyers to attend the Poznan trials, but the Polish authorities refused them entry because of political
considerations. Amid criticism, the government finally invited three independent observers of their own
choosing and thus helped to confirm the international practice of receiving trial observers. [Reproduced in
the accompanying notebook at Tab 9]
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1970s.26 Records of trial observations by governments have been much less reliable than
that of NGOs for various reasons.27
An FTO ideally would be an unbiased third party, also sent on a mission by an
NGO,28 who is sent to ensure that a trial is conducted in accordance with the standards of
customary international law. At times, governments have worked together with NGOs to
send observers to trials. “For example, the Australian, British, Canadian, German, and
United States embassies, together with several nongovernmental organizations,
successfully sent observers to the trial of the Thammasat 18 in Thailand.”29 The U.N. has
also sent observers to trials on several occasions.30 Other senders have included the
Inter-American Commission on Human Rights of the Organization of American States.31
It seems that by 1982, the practice of sending and receiving fair trial observers could have
been characterized as customary.32

26

Id.

27

Id at 31, 32. “Institutional Memory” the idea that certain practices are forgotten as personnel move out
of certain positions, is a large reason that there is not more tradition in the

28

Id at 27. Governments are not the only ones who send FTOs. NGOs including Amnesty International,
the International Association of Democratic Lawyers, the International Commission of Jurists, the
International Federation of Human Rights, and the International League for Human Rights have also sent
observers to significant political trials in all parts of the world.
29

Id. at 32.

30

Id. at 34.

31

Bernard H. Oxma, Jeanine Bucherer, Human Rights, Trial Observation and Monitoring the
Administration of Justice, Training Manual on Human Rights Monitoring, (2001). [Reproduced in the
accompanying notebook at Tab 25]

32

Id. at 38-40. Even though the practice of accepting trial observers could be characterized as uniform,
several states have, in the past, not permitted the practice. Czechoslovakia expelled observers in 1967 and
1979. Greece accepted observers at 27 trials between 1959 ands 1974 but refused an observer in 1970.
Iran even expelled an observer and sentenced his interpreter to ten years in prison. Bulgaria, Chile,
Colombia, the Dominican Republic, Egypt, Nicaragua, Poland, a former colony of Portugal, South Africa,
Spain, Taiwan, and the U.S.S.R have all at one time or another not allowed observers. Even so, not all
nations which have been hostile to foreign observers object to them all of the time.
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C. What role should an observer play?
According to the International Commission of Jurists’ Guidelines, the key goals of a trial
observer are:
•

to make known to the court, the authorities of the country and to the general
public the interest in and concern for the trial in question;

•

to encourage a court to give the accused a fair trial. The impact of an observer’s
presence in a courtroom cannot be evaluated with mathematical precision.
However, both observers and defense attorneys have pointed out that a monitor’s
presence often changes the atmosphere in the courtroom and facilitates defense
by, inter alia, making the court more cognizant of the defense’s arguments,
encouraging defense counsel and the defendant to be more forceful in contesting
the prosecution’s claims, in attracting media attention to the trial, etc;

•

to obtain more information about the conduct of the trial, the nature of the case
against the accused and the legislation under which s/he is being tried; and

•

to collect general background information about the political and legal
circumstances leading to the trial and possibility affecting its outcome.33

III. The role of FTOs in High Profile Trials.
One of the documented problems of international criminal tribunals is that of
victor’s justice. Fair Trial Observers are a relatively new concept, especially with regard
to courts that have stamps of approval from the United Nations. NGOs have limited
resources and would not like to expend limited funds on trials they generally view as fair.
However, even the landmark Nuremberg trial had its doubters. Employing FTOs in any
controversial international trial, which would probably be every international trial
involving high level defendants, would help to ease doubts to the fairness of that trial.
Even in the ICTR, there are doubts among the local populace as to the fairness of
the trial proceedings.34 Complaints range from lack of secrecy (for secret testimony of

33

See International Commission of Jurists (ICJ), Guidelines for ICJ Observers to Trials (1978).
[Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 26-b]
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witnesses) to a lack of swift justice.35 Regardless of the claim, whether it be valid or not,
international tribunals must do all they can to gain the confidence of the target country
and the international community. Perhaps just as important as the outcome of individual
trials is the legacy the tribunals leave behind.
III. Two Types of International Criminal Law Trials: Those Focusing on War
Crimes and Those Covering all Aspects of International Criminal Law
A. Special Tribunals
1. The Nuremberg Trials, In re Yamashita
Regardless of the circumstances, criticism is inevitable; allegations and critics can
and will emerge from the most unexpected places.
In light of the atrocities committed by the Nazis during World War II, the
international community felt a collective need for justice. After the war, the victorious
allied forces convened in Nuremberg to prosecute the German war criminals.36 Despite
meticulous documentation of crimes by the Nazis that outlined their crimes in
excruciating detail, polls of West German citizens between 1946 and 1958 indicated that
the Germans believed the Nuremberg Trials were not just; rather, they were an example
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BBC. http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/africa/2072578.stm. Witnesses returning from recording secret
testimony at the court in Arusha found that relatives of suspects and everyone else in the village knew
exactly what had been said. Last visited November 5, 2003. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook
at Tab 29]
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BBC. http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/africa/2072578.stm. Detailing protests accompanying Del
Ponte’s (ICTR Prosecutor) visit to Kigali. They were unhappy at the slow prosecution rate at the
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda as evidenced by eight convictions in seven years and one
acquittal. Many genocide survivors had since stopped co-operating with the Arusha tribunal. [Reproduced
in the accompanying notebook at Tab 29]
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Louis B. Sohn, From Nazi Germany and Japan to Yugoslavia and Rwanda: Similarities and Differences,
12 Conn. J. Int’l L. 209 (1997). [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab ]
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of victor’s justice.37 The Allies also dealt with the leaders of their other vanquished
enemy, the Japanese. As the Germans, the Japanese were accused of committing war
crimes.38 The trial of Japanese Lieutenant General Tomoyoki Yamashita, also known as
the Tiger of Malaya, was originally held in a U.S. military tribunal before the end of the
war between the United States and Japan.39 He was tried under various conventions and
treaties, found guilty, and sentenced to death.40 The U.S. Supreme Court eventually
heard the appeal of his conviction that objected to the jurisdiction of the military court
and of course to the finding of guilt itself. The conviction was upheld. There was,
however, a strong dissent on the part of Justice Frank J. Murphy41 who wrote, “[t]o
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Michael P. Scharf, The Legacy of the Milosevic Trial, 37 N. Engl. L. Rev. 915, 932 (2002). citing Peter
Maguire. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook]
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Dissent of Justice Murphy, In re Yamashita, 327 U.S. 1, The Supreme Court gives us background
information on General Yamashita. “Prior to September 3, 1945, petitioner was the commanding General
of the Fourteenth Army Group of the Imperial Japanese Army in the Philippine Islands. On that day, he
surrendered to the United States Army and became a prisoner of war. Respondent was the commanding
General of the United States Army Forces, Western Pacific [Wilhelm D. Styer], whose command embraced
the Philippine Islands. Respondent appointed a military commission to try the petitioner on a charge of
violation of the law of war. The gist of the charge was that petitioner had failed in his duty as an army
commander to control the operations of his troops, “permitting them to commit” specified atrocities against
the civilian population and prisoners of war. Petitioner was found guilty and sentenced to death.”
[Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 6]
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Id. Yamashita was charged with breach of his duty to control operations of members of his command, by
permitting them to commit specified atrocities, what measures, if any, such officer took to prevent
violations of law of war by troops under his command, or whether such measures as may have been taken
were appropriate, were questions for military commission trying such officer and were not for the courts,
where peace had not been proclaimed though actual hostilities had ceased.
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Id. Yamashita was charged with the massacre of civilian population and wanton destruction of public,
private, and religious property without cause or military necessity, and acts of violence, cruelty, and
homicide inflicted upon civilian population and prisoners of war, are recognized in international law as
violations of the law of war. Annex to Fourth Hague Convention 1907, arts. 4, 28, 46, 47, 36 Stat. 2296,
2303, 2306, 2307.
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Infoplease.com, http://www.infoplease.com/ce6/people/A0834498.html, Biographical information on
Justice Murphy: “American political figure, Associate Justice of the Supreme Court (1940–49), b. Harbor
Beach, Mich. After serving as a U.S. attorney (1919–20) and …Elected governor of Michigan in 1936, his
settlement of the automobile strike (1937) in Flint, Mich., made him a national figure. In Jan., 1939,
Murphy, a New Deal Democrat, was appointed U.S. Attorney General and served until his appointment to
the Supreme Court. For a short time in 1942 he left the bench to serve as an army officer. Justice Murphy's
opinions reflected his ardent liberalism. In his dissenting opinion in Korematsu v. United States (1944), he
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subject an enemy belligerent to an unfair trial, to charge him with an unrecognized crime,
or to vent on him our retributive emotions only antagonizes the enemy nation and hinders
the reconciliation necessary to a peaceful world.”42 Murphy’s dissent signals the
recognition of the need for fair trials for all defendants, regardless of the crime accused
and regardless of the prestige of the court. It gives notice that, no matter the goal of the
court or of its moral high ground, a conviction gained by unfair means is in the end a step
in the wrong direction toward the ultimate goal of reconciliation.
2. ICTY, Tadic
Even a trial that takes every conceivable precaution will be criticized.
As evidenced by the Tadic trial, there is such thing as style points when it comes
to International Criminal Tribunals. Dusko Tadic was convicted of only 11 counts of a
31 count indictment at the ICTY. Many saw the Tadic trial as a “bust” because of the
outcome.43 According to Michael P. Scharf, “’Essentially, Tadic was convicted of just
being a thug and a bully; they thought he was the butcher of Omarska, and it turns out
that he was just the bully of Omarska.’”44 While this outcome may have been
disappointing to those prosecuting Tadic, “’It turned out that the process was extremely
fair, maybe agonizingly fair.’”45 The tedious nature of the trial46 tended to give credence

stated that the wartime internment of Japanese-Americans was unconstitutional.” (Last visited November
12, 2003).
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Dissent of Justice Murphy, supra note 38 at 28-29. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 6]
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James Podgers, A Victory for Process, 83- JUL A.B.A. J. 30 (1997). [Reproduced in the accompanying
notebook at Tab 13]

44

Id. at 30.
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Id.
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See Alvarez, supra note 8, at 2053. Alvarez outlines the lengths gone to by the ICTY to ensure a fair
trial. “Despite the meticulous case presented by the prosecution, the relatively strong defense mounted by
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to the ICTY specifically and more broadly to international criminal law. While the trial
itself may have been viewed as a loss and a disappointment, it can be chalked up as a
victory in the war to gain jurisdiction over suspected war criminals. The trial left little
doubt as to its own fairness, “[t]he Tadic verdict affirms both the feasibility and fairness
of the tribunal process.”47
That was the initial reaction to the trial, in the Western World. Afterwards, the
words ‘feasibility’ and ‘fairness’ were rarely used. There has been a rash of criticism to
the Tadic trial, ranging from accusations that Tadic was only indicted and convicted
because he was a Serb living in Prijedor48 to claims that Tadic was convicted of crimes,
such as persecution, that until Tadic’s trial, were not considered crimes at all. On the
point of ex post facto laws, it has been argued that:
criminal defendants before the Yugoslav tribunal now have no clear notice about
whether acts such as advocacy on behalf of Serbian nationalism the
discriminatory firing of non-Serb employees, or the refusal to treat a Muslim
patient at a hospital constitute the crime of persecution under crimes against
humanity.49
In the end, the ICTY came under much criticism for what it thought was a trial conducted
in the fairest manner possible. Unfortunately, the ICTY was not immune from criticism
by any means. The ICTY likely could have learned valuable lessons had they elected to

Tadic’s attorneys, the more than 120 witnesses and hundreds of exhibits, the 7000 pages of trial transcripts,
and the painstaking and lengthy written judgment, the Tadic verdict has generated, at least in Serbian
circles, chilly indifference or worse.” [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 15]
47

See Podgers, supra note 11 at 30. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 13]
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Scharf, supra note 37, The reaction to Tadic’s conviction and sentence was, within the Balkans, strongly
divided along Serb/ non-Serb lines.
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Alvarez, supra note 8 at 2063. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 15]
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employ an FTO, possibly lessening the criticism that accompanied the Tadic decision, but
certainly helping to alleviate future criticism.
Much to the surprise of the ICTY, the Tadic decision has prompted disdain among
many common law attorneys. Even a former legal advisor the U.S. State Department has
lobbied for a “Bill of Rights” to be attached to the U.N. Charter to prevent procedural
decisions criticized in Tadic in the future.50 Perhaps the worst indictment against the
ICTY in the Tadic trial was that it effectively criminalized having a political agenda
contrary to that of the countries most responsible for establishing and funding the
tribunal.51 It also happened that theses same countries were also the driving force for the
military action taken against the Serbs. The most common term for this particular
accusation is known as “victor’s justice.”
Similarly, the ICTR faces the obstacle of being called the administrators of
victor’s justice. The very establishment of the ICTR may be called into question by
critics of the Chamber. The reason behind the criticism is as simple as it is troublesome;
in order to be allowed to establish a Tribunal in the first place, the U.N. agreed, at the
request of the Rwandan government that the jurisdiction of the court would extend only
to the calendar year 1994. That is, anything that did not happen in 1994 could not be
brought before the ICTR, regardless of the number of people killed or the heinousness of

50

Id.

51

Id. at 2059. Alvarez got the impression that the opinion served as an indictment of not only Tadic, but
Serbian nationalism. Consequently, the Tribunal has risked being perceived as a political tool rather than
merely a legal instrument.
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the alleged crimes.52 The effect was to immediately call into question the legitimacy of
the tribunal. The Rwandan government that agreed with the U.N. to allow the tribunal to
be established was, for the purposes of this particular war, the victor. This same
government was comprised mostly of Tutsis, whose actions after 1994 are reputed to
have rivaled those of the Hutus who were being prosecuted before the ICTR. Although
the ICTR can do nothing to change the circumstances of its genesis, it should be aware
that such criticisms are present.
3. ICTY, Milosevic
Tribunals are always vulnerable to political undermining, especially by politicians.
The only FTO available for this trial so far has been the Serbian public. And, so
far, they have not been pleased with the deliberations of the ICTY. Although reactions
have been mixed, there is a perception, especially in Serbia, that the Milosevic trial is
implicitly unfair and based on the Milosevic’s political, rather than legal, situation.53 The
Milosevic trial was at first aired on the Serbian State television station but to the dismay
of the new pro-Western government of Zoran Djindjic; Milosevic was quickly gaining
popularity because of these broadcasts, becoming one of the most revered figures in
Serbia, turning from a ‘goat’ to a hero in a matter of days. In the words of a typical Serb
viewer, “[w]e cheer when he outsmarts the prosecutors. When he’s defending himself all
alone against the world.”54 Consequently, the new government stopped airing the
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Human Rights Watch, World Report 1998 – Rwanda – Human Rights Developments,
http://www.hrw.org/worldreport/Africa-10.htm, (Last visited Nov. 5, 2003). [Reproduced in the
accompanying notebook at Tab ]
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BBC, Milosevic Trial: Is He Persuading Anyone? http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/talking_point/1815817.stm;
(last visited Nov. 5, 2003). [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab ]
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See Scharf, supra note 25, Id. at 917, citing Marc Champion, Court of Opinion: With Hague Case,
Defiant Milosevic Wins at Home; As Daily Coverage Keeps Serbs Riveted to TV, Many Feel As if They’re
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broadcasts, but it could not stop Milosevic’s re-ascension to stardom.55 Any court that
successfully tries and convicts a “superstar”56 will undoubtedly incur the wrath of a
disappointed public, in this case the Serbs. In fact, Milosevic’s goal is not to obtain a
dismissal or an acquittal but to publicly discredit the Tribunal, questioning its authority
and often making political rather than legal arguments.57
There are many grounds on which the Milosevic trial can, and has, been
questioned. In the case of the Milosevic trial, for now at least, there may be no
convincing anyone that the trial was fair, despite facts of atrocities that can only be
contradicted with claims that all of the testimony against Milosevic is, ‘second-hand.’58
Despite the reluctance of parties to admit wrong doing, for the posterity of the ICTY and
the importance of convicting Milosevic to the world at large, employing FTOs at such a
trial would be advisable.
It should be noted that the Tribunal did appoint lawyers from the United Kingdom
(Steven Kay), the Netherlands (Michail Wladimiroff), and Serbia as amici curiae (friends

on Trial Too, Wall St. J., Jan. 10, 2003, at A-1, available at 2003 WL- WSJ 3956244. [Reproduced in the
accompanying notebook]
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Radio Netherlands, Serbia After Milosevic, http://www.rnw.nl/hotspots/html/serbia020628.html; (last
visited Nov. 5, 2003). [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab ]
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Scharf, supra note 25 at 930. Recent polls show, “thirty-nine percent of the Serb population rated
Milosevic’s trial performance ‘superior,’ while less than twenty-five percent felt that he was getting a fair
trial, and only thirty-three percent thought that he was actually responsible for war crimes.” Citing Andre
Purvis, Star Power in Serbia; Slobodan Milosevic’s Performance at his War Crimes Trial has Won Him
Increased Popularity at Home, TIME, Sept. 30, 2002 at 46.
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Id. at 921.
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Human Rights Watch, Milosevic Insiders to Testify,
http://www.hrw.org/editorials/2002/iwpr071802.htm, (last visited Nov. 1, 2003). [Reproduced in the
accompanying notebook at Tab ]
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of the court);59 however, these observers to not seem to ‘fit the bill’ as FTOs. First,
although they are described as ‘neutral observers’, they can actually become involved in
the trial by challenging the prosecution and cross-examining witnesses.60 In fact, these
amici curiae seem to be the Tribunal’s response to Milosevic’s request that he be allowed
to represent himself. Despite the fact that Milosevic studied law in Belgrade and finished
near the top of his class,61 the Tribunal likely did not want to let Milosevic give himself
more ammunition to make arguments that he was overmatched and did not stand a chance
against the superior prosecutors of the ICTY. Milosevic, however, does want to retain
the appearance of an underdog, shunning any appearance of appreciation for the lawyers
who are there to help him. According to Kay, he said hello to Milosevic every day, and
Milosevic would not return the salutation.62
4. General Criticism of the ICTR & ICTY
The ICTR, just like the Yamashita trial, the Nuremberg Tribunal and ICTY, has
come under criticism for its handling of trials.63 Some commentators have strongly
criticized the ICTY’s admission of testimony from anonymous witnesses, seemingly in
direct contravention of its own statute.64 However, “[o]vert judicial bias does not appear
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The Independent (UK), Milosevic Shuns British Lawyer Brought in to Ensure Trial is Fair, 10 February,
2002. http://news.independent.co.uk/world/europe/story.jsp?story=119211. (last visited Nov. 17, 2003).
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Michael P. Scharf, Slobodan Milosevic on Trial: A Companion, Chapter 8, 97-111.
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Id.
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???, Fair Trials and the Role of International Criminal Defense, 114 Harv. L. Rev. 1982, 1983-1984
(2001). [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab ]
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to have been a major problem at the tribunals thus far. 65 There is little credible evidence
of bias for or against any of the ethnic or national groups prominent at the tribunals as
defendants or victims.”66
Many criticisms of the court, however, could not be helped by FTOs. One
criticism of the system is that its rules of procedure affect an adversarial, common law
approach, while many of the members of counsel for the defense are attorneys from civil
law systems.67 These attorneys had to sometimes undergo “crash courses” in cross
examination in order to mount a formidable defense for their clients.68 Another problem
for the defense attorneys was that they were underpaid. This situation was addressed by
giving a raise to these attorneys across the board.69 It has been advocated by some that
the only way to level the playing field for the defense teams would be to institute an
independent defense and a full time, well trained defense bar.70 When it comes to the
structure of the Tribunal and the procedure (according to the Charter of the ICTR) used
therein, FTOs can do very little.
B. International Trials; Not Special Tribunals

65

Id. at 1995.
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Id. at 1995, There have been comments that the composition of the judiciary did not match that of the
populations that were being tried.
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Id. at 2000.
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Id at 2000. Alvarez gives an account of a civil attorney who was trying hard to grasp the common law
system. “Dutch criminal defense attorney and professor Michael Waldimiroff, recognized before this trial
his own (and his counsel’s) lack of adversarial experience and, in conjunction with the ICTY and the
American Bar Association’s Central and East European Law Initiative, arranged for a week-long crossexamination training session with one British and two American attorneys.”
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Id. at 2004.
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3. Castillo-Petruzzi
This is a classic example of an unfair trial. Observers can have a positive influence
on the outcome toward fairness.
Trial observers took note of a case where four Chilean nationals were tried in a
Peruvian court for treason.71 The four, arrested in Lima were members of the
Movimiento Revolucionario Tupac Amaru (Revolutionary Movement Tupac Amaru,
MRTA) and were presumed to have committed acts of treason. In accordance with
applicable Peruvian antiterrorism provisions, the antiterrorism police force (Dirrecion
Nacional contra el Terrorismo, DINCONTE), which allowed suspects of Treason to be
detained for 15 (in some cases 30) days without being brought before a judge if required.
The defendants were tried before a faceless tribunal. According to the Inter-American
Court of Human Rights, the Peruvian Military Court committed the following
violations.72 The Court overturned the conviction of the military court on various
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Bernard Oxman, Jeanine Bucherer, Human Rights – Fair Trial Guarantees – Trial of Civilians by
Military Tribunal – Annulment of Criminal Proceedings – Obligation to Amend Legislation, 95 Am. J. Int’l
L. 171 (2001). The four were accused of “treason against the fatherland” (tracion a la patria) despite the
fact that they were not Peruvian nationals. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 25]
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Id. The Peruvian military court committed a laundry list of violations including:
• 1 suspect was held incommunicado for 36 days
• Three suspects were held for a total of 37 days each.
• Suspects were required to make declarations of fact to DINCONTE before being granted access to
counsel. Lawyers were allowed to defend only one treason or terrorism suspect at a time.
• Conversations not confidential, as military listened.
• Petitions for habeas corpus were not permitted
• Case was heard in a Peruvian air force court and was presided over by a ‘faceless judge’ who had
a maximum of 10 days to give a decision.
• Three of applicants were convicted of treason and sentenced to life without parole, solitary for a
year and hard labor after
• Court ruled that it had no jurisdiction over the 4th defendant yet continued to hold him.
• Convictions and sentences were upheld on appeal by courts of second and third instance.
• Special Supreme Military Tribunal modified the judgment of the trial court so as to condemn the
4th to life imprisonment for treason.
• Inter-American Court recommended that Peru annul the convictions and retry in civil court with
due respect for fair trial guarantees
• Special Supreme Military Tribunal modified the judgment of the trial court so as to condemn the
4th to life imprisonment for Treason
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grounds, including but not limited to the holding that military courts are not fit to try
civilians.73 This case is an example of triumph for FTOs, as they were able to affect a
positive outcome for the accused.
4. Connolly, Monaghan, McCauley; Irishmen in Columbia
Human rights activists have raised a clamor in Columbia over the arrest of three
Irishmen in Columbia. The Columbian government contends that these men were in the
country for the express purpose of training members of the Revolutionary Armed Forces
of Colombia, more commonly known by its Spanish language acronym of FARC. The
three men were originally held for six months for traveling on false documents.74 It is not
known why these men were traveling in Colombia on false passports.75 Amnesty
International did eventually send an FTO amid claims that the three were being held in
unsafe prisons.76 This trial is relatively high profile simply because it involves ties to

•
•
•
•
•
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Id. “"I am fearful for their safety. There was a gun battle in the prison they were in last year in which 13
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said.” Id. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab ]
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terrorism and the arrest of non-Colombian nationals in Colombia. It seems that the FTO
sent by Amnesty was not able to do anything for the three other than to offer his support
as their detention has continued without any significant change.77
5. Abdullah Öcalan
FTOs were not allowed to attend the highly anticipated trial of leader of the Kurdish
Workers’ Party (PKK) despite international pressure to do so.
Another trial that seemed to cry out for FTOs was that of Kurdish leader Abdullah
Clan in Turkey.78 Clan was tried for tens of thousands of ‘extrajudiciary’ killings
committed by his group the PKK, while it was under his direction.79 FTOs were sent to
the trial by the U.N. and by Amnesty International. Turkey held the trial on a hard to
reach island and did not allow FTOs to attend the trial.80 Also, the European Union,
Human Rights Watch and even the United States lobbied for the Turkish judiciary to
foreswear the death penalty as an option in punishing Őcalan.81

Turkish Prime Minister

Bulent Ecevit went so far as to say that his government needed no advice on how to
conduct the trial.82 Accordingly, these pleas fell on deaf ears, however, as Őcalan was
sentenced to death on June 29, 1999. Commentators suggest that one of the main reasons
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Őcalan, leader of the Workers Party of Kurdistan (PKK), was tried for treason.
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Human Rights Watch, List of massacres attributed to the PKK or for which the PKK took responsibility,
Letter to Italian Prime Minister Massimo D’Alema, urging him to charge or extradite Őcalan.
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accompanying notebook at Tab ]
80

BBC. EU Urges Fair Ocalan Trial, http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/europe/283810.stm. (Last visited
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that Turkey did not allow FTOs into its courts has to do with its rejection by the
European Union for membership.83 Turkish officials were especially upset in a
seemingly ironic situation where Italy would not extradite Őcalan, a suspected terrorist,
to Turkey, a country that it had recently criticized for its human rights record.84 Human
Rights Watch even sent a letter urging that Őcalan be brought to justice.85 Őcalan was
eventually captured in Africa and returned to Turkey before his trial.
Similarly, the trial of two Australian humanitarian aid workers in Yugoslavia,
Steve Pratt and Peter Wallace, disallowed the presence of observers.86 The men were
charged with spying and were suspected of such because they owned mobile phones and
laptop computers.87 FTOs have been seen as a threat to the sovereignty of states and their
courts. Perhaps that is one reason that FTOs were not allowed to observe this particular
trial. This case mainly goes to show the ICTR what perceptions may accompany FTOs
when they attend (or are not allowed to attend) trials.
4. Pan Am Flight 103, “A Spectacular Miscarriage of Justice”
This case is a manifestation of a clear risk for the ICTR, and also of the need for
preventative maintenance.
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Holly Cartrier, Executive Director, Europe and Central Asia Division of Human Rights Watch, Letter of
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to extradite him to a country other than Turkey. [Reproduced at Tab 28]
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http://www.cnn.com/WORLD/europe/9905/26/yugo.care.trial.02/ (last visited November 18, 2003).
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In the prosecution of the Libyans who were suspected of orchestrating the
destruction of Pan Am Flight 103, the United Kingdom informed the Secretary-General
of the United Nations that it would welcome, “the presence of international observers
from the United Nations at the trial of the suspects of the Lockerbie bombing.”88
Professor Hans Köchler, a professor of philosophy at the University of Innsbruck in
Austria, and one of five U.N. observers to the trial89 had this to say: “I am at a loss to
explain how this decision of the appeal court can have passed unanimously…I am not
convinced at all that the events that led to this explosion of the plane…was as described
by the court. Everything that is presented is only circumstantial evidence.”90 Köchler
went on to state that he based his observation solely on logic and reason.91 However, it is
entirely possible that Professor Köchler’s training in philosophy did not afford him the
necessary understanding of common law criminal proceedings. This possibility was
reflected in the statement of Clare Connelly, a member of the Trial Briefing Unit at
Glasgow University, who said that “Professor Köchler’s comments displayed a ‘profound
misunderstanding’ of Scotland’s adversarial legal system.”92 This possibility of an
observer who may suffer from a ‘profound misunderstanding’ of the law underlies the
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point that selecting a trial observer who is well versed in the applicable is so important.
This topic is discussed in “Selecting a Fair Trial Observer,” below.
5. Al Odah v. United States and Rasul v. Bush
Even the United States Supreme Court may be subject to FTOs. It is very likely
that FTOs will be sent to these trials, if and when they occur.
The United States Supreme Court has recently agreed to hear the cases of several
of the detainees at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba.93 These men have been detained at the U.S.
military base in Cuba under the premise that they pose a threat to American National
Security. It will be interesting to see whether, and if so how many, observers are
dispatched to such a trial.
IV.
Benefits vs. Risks for the ICTR
A. What are the likely benefits of having FTOs at ICTR trials?
First, an FTO will be able to gather facts firsthand and prepare an impartial,
independent, and objective report. Second, the very presence of an observer will tend to
make the judges and the prosecutor more circumspect in the face of powerful and
authoritative outside criticism. Third, the FTO will give the defendant, the defense
attorneys, and the supporters of the defendant a sense of international support and
renewed confidence.94 Fourth, and perhaps most importantly, the presence of an FTO
will be a physical manifestation of a fair minded legal conscience that cannot be disputed.
Questioning the fairness of a trial found to be fair by an expert and unbiased third party is
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decidedly more difficult than questioning the fairness of a trial scrutinized only by its
own checks and balances.
B. What are the potential risks of having FTOs at ICTR trials?
There is the risk that using FTOs of its own volition will be viewed as an admission of
error.
As the norm for selecting trials to send observers, NGO’s have usually selected those
trials that seem to be especially likely to be unfair. With this frame of mind, there is a
risk that the ICTR would be somehow seen as indicting itself by choosing to use FTOs of
its own will. After all, why should a court that purports to be at the cutting edge of
prosecution of war crimes and crimes against humanity have to monitor itself? Critics
will surely take these self imposed FTOs as an opportunity to criticize the court.
However, initiating the use of FTOs to check itself could be a wonderful opportunity
for the ICTR to shine. The court has heard allegations that its proceedings are unfair.
Instead of turning a deaf hear to the criticism and doing nothing, the ICTR can take a
bold and proactive step to absolve itself before absolution is necessary. By employing
FTOs, the ICTR would become possible the most transparent courts of all time. Any
criticism will come swiftly and allow the court to make adjustments.
There is the possibility that if the Tribunal makes an adjustment based on a report of
an FTO, it will be viewed as an admission of error
.
If reports of FTOs somehow discredit the fairness or procedure of the court, it may
be a temporary blow to the tribunal. A coveted conviction may be forever lost to the
Tribunal. The benefit is that the Tribunal may recognize its error and ameliorate it, to
ensure the enforceability of future verdicts and the common belief in the fairness of the
court.
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C. Should the ICTR employ its own FTOs or should it request NGO’s to send
observers?
Getting FTOs from NGOs will be difficult as they will be wont to use their
resources on trials that already seem to be fair in almost every conceivable way.
Amnesty International has stated that it “can't send an observer to every single
trial.”95 The ICTR should consider using both its own FTO and also request FTOs from
‘outside’ sources such as the U.N. However, it is unlikely that NGOs would send their
own observers to Arusha. The best prospect would seem to be obtaining FTOs from the
United Nations. While FTOs from the outside would help in deflecting criticism of
unfair and biased proceedings, FTOs on the inside could help the court to avoid blunders
in the first place. This person could be considered to be a hired consultant, with all of the
same qualifications as an outside FTO. There is one important quality that this person
must have that the normal FTO does not necessarily need. This person should have, in
addition to the requisite legal background and language skills, a very good feel for
politics. That is because, in addition to ensuring fairness, an inside FTO should work to
ensure that the image and perception of the ICTR is maintained and possibly even
improved. Such matters are inextricably linked to politics. However, instead of reporting
to the outside world the errors of the court after the fact, this FTO could report possible
problems to the Chamber in private before they occur.
This FTO, like any other FTO, should remain detached. At the same time, however,
this person should also remain informed of the day to day business of the Chamber. This
FTO would function as an observer but also as a kind of mole, a benevolent spy, a fair
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trial consultant, or an angel on the shoulder of the court. Whatever this person should be
called, the idea of his or her function is clear. This person is a consultant for risk
management to the ICTR.
As is the case with most consultants, this person may be very expensive. But
whatever the cost of such a consultant, it must be considered, especially since the legacy
of the court may be at stake. Even if this person were paid $200,000 per year, it would
only amount to 0.2% of the total annual ICTR budget of $100,000,000. Such an amount
seems infinitesimally small when compared to the sums already put forth by the Tribunal,
and even smaller when considering that it could help to secure the very legacy of the
court. Having this ‘extra’ and ‘inside’ NGO could be prove to a large benefit importance
to the ICTR.
D. Guidelines
1. Choice of Trials
Every trial is of great importance by the very nature of the Tribunal; have FTOs at
every trial if at all possible.
The ICTR should lobby to have a fair trial observer sent to the trial of every
defendant. Such an action would be commensurate with doing everything possible to
deflect criticism of the tribunal. If it is not possible or practicable to obtain an FTO for
every trial, the main factors to consider when deciding which trials to have monitored are,
“the stature of the person on trial, the political or human rights significance of the
proceedings, the historical relevance of the trial, the media attention generated by the
case, anticipated irregularities in the proceedings, etc.”96 Many NGOs have set forth their
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own standards for trial selection.97 Adapting this standard from general international trial
observation to observing for the ICTR, the Tribunal should definitely obtain FTOs for all
of the trials it anticipates to be the most publicized or scrutinized. However, considering
that anyone tried before the Tribunal will be accused of grave crimes, obtaining an FTO
for every trial would be ideal.
2. Selecting a Trial Observer
It is advisable to select someone who is prestigious in the legal field. In many ways
the decision to use FTOs is a political one. The greater the credibility of the FTO, the
more credibility the Tribunal will be accorded, at least in terms of fairness. These people
will be in great demand.
Professor Weissbrodt tells us that, “Qualified, impartial, and prestigious observers
add the weight of their personal reputations to a mission…”98 He tells us further that the
most important factors in selecting an observer should be the “independence, impartiality,
and qualifications”99 of the individual being considered. The potential should also be
well versed in international humanitarian law and familiar with the trial(s) in question.
Although it may be more efficient to use staff members of an NGO or to have a person
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assigned to trials full time, a “prestigious independent expert” 100 will certainly be more
effective when it comes to bolstering the reputation of the fairness of the trial. The ICTR
should be strongly cautioned against using local lawyers as FTOs. Although they may be
well versed in international humanitarian law, local lawyers are much more susceptible to
the charge of bias. Several NGO’s, including Amnesty International, have specific rules
against using local lawyers as FTOs.101
After considering the factors of impartiality, prestige and general qualifications of
a potential observer, it is very important to find someone who is fluent in the language of
the court.102 It would be extremely difficult for someone who does not speak English or
French understand the proceedings of the Tribunal, much less to comment on their
fairness. Because of the mix of language and also the mix of civil and common
procedure and law, it would seem most advantageous to send observers from any of the
states of the British Commonwealth, the United States, or France. These observers
should not only have a firm grasp of the language of the Tribunal, but also of the legal
system being applied.103 It is important to note that the best trial observers will tend to be
well respected lawyers or professors. It is likely that these individuals will be available
for only one or two weeks at a time, at the most.104 Consequently, it may be advisable to

100

Id.

101

Weissbrodt, supra note 10 at 71, citing “Organizations are often quite sensitive to the appearance of bias
which might arise from nationality. For a trial to be held in the Ivory Coast, Amnesty International selected
a French speaking Swiss observer and not a French lawyer, because the principal defendant was French.
See Amnesty International, Mission Report on Ivory Coast Trial, July 1974 (unpublished report).
[Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 9]

102

Id. at 68.

103

Id.

104

I would like to thank Michael Scharf for making this point.

30

have two or even three FTOs ready for each trial. This FTO should not be confused with
the ‘consultant’ FTO to the Tribunal proposed above. The consultant would do many of
the same things as the regular FTOs, but with an eye toward a special charge of risk
management for the Triunal.
3. Briefing
It is important to send an FTO into the Tribunal with a good grasp of the case itself
and the situation surrounding it before sending him or her into court.
At the outset of an observer’s mission, he should be briefed by the sending NGO on
(i) the approach, policies, and methods of the sending organization, (ii) the case
background, including the relevant international legal framework in the proceedings; (iii)
the name, addresses, and background of lawyers, translators and other contacts during the
proceedings, as the situation may necessitate; and (iv) the means of the FTOs
communication with the organization while on the mission.105
4. Translator
If a translator is necessary to interview witnesses or defendants, impartiality is
extremely important.
Although the working languages of the ICTR are English and French,106 an FTO
competent in both languages may still be at a loss, especially in dealings with the
defendant(s) and witnesses. If an observer who can speak the native language(s) of
Rwanda cannot be found, then a translator shall be provided to the observer. This
interpreter should accompany the observer to interview defendants, victims, and
witnesses as necessary. In the case that an interpreter is necessary, finding someone who
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is unbiased or otherwise unaffiliated with the parties involved in the proceedings is of
tantamount importance. Ideally, the translator would have the relevant legal knowledge
and be trustworthy and reliable.107
5. Travel and Housing Arrangements; Visas and Other Entry Formalities
Hotels near the Tribunal are the best option. Staying with members of the Tribunal,
the defense, or the prosecution gives rise to an appearance of impropriety.
If the observer must travel to get to the trial, arrangement should be made for
someone to meet the observer and provide the observer with a briefing. This person
should not be involved with the proceedings.108 The observer should stay in a hotel near
to the courtroom in a hotel or some other form of accommodation. An observer should
never accept an offer to be hosted by those involved in the proceedings.109 Doing so
could undermine the very impartial perception that is so wholly central to the observer.110
For a trial being observed abroad (in relation to the domicile of the NGO or the
observer), it would be easiest to select a person who does not need a visa or someone who
already has one. If a visa is needed, an Order of Mission (Letter of Credentials) should
be given to the observer to present, along with the requisite visa, upon entry into the
country. The letter should state the purpose of the visit, to attend the trial in question on
behalf of the sponsoring organization.111
6. Public Statements

107

Weissbrodt supra note 10 at 24. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 9]

108

Id. at 83.

109

Id. at 84.

110

Id. at 119.

111

Id. at 24.

32

An FTO should not make any public statements during the course of the trial
regarding the course of the trial itself. An FTO should, however, approach the media to
inform them of his or her presence.112
Regardless of the policy set forth by the ICTR, the observer should feel free to
communicate with the media as necessary.113 If there is a matter which the FTO feels
should be communicated to the press, the FTO should do so at his or her discretion.114 In
the case of the ICTR, where there is radio coverage of the trial, statements may be
expected of the FTO, especially after making affirmative statements as to his or her
presence.
7. Contacts and Interviews During the Mission
An observer should try to contact the parties and the presiding judge before
proceedings begin.115 He or she may also want to meet with government officials and
make a public announcement as to his or her presence. The observer should also be sure
to interview the defendant in full confidentiality, in order to observe the circumstances of
the detention and the state of the defendant, mental and physical.116 If possible, the
observer should also interview witnesses to see if they are given adequate assurances of
safety and anonymity, when applicable.117
8. Seating in the Courtroom
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It is important for an FTO to sit neither with the defense nor the prosecution; as
doing so would contribute to a perception of supporting one side over the other.
Observers have taken various approaches to seating, whether with the defense, the
prosecution or in the public audience. Sitting with either side in a trial can lead to the
perception that the FTO is partial to one side or the other. This perception is not
desirable. It may also be problematic to sit with the public, as the seats may not be as
good, making observation more difficult.118 It may make the most sense to make a
special seating area for the FTOs, so that they may at once readily observe the
proceedings of the trial without having to sit with either the prosecution or the defense.119
9. Introduction in Open Court
Assuming that the whole purpose of having an FTO is to show the world that your
Court is fair, this step is essential.
By having the FTO introduced in open court, it is assured that the public will be
aware of his or her presence. There is a risk to introducing an FTO if that FTO will not
be able to attend the entirety of the proceedings, as such an absence will surely be noticed
by the public as well.
10. Taking Notes
In order to give the impression that the Tribunal is under constant scrutiny and for
the FTO to keep his or her own accurate record, the FTO should take extensive notes.120
It is important for any FTO to take notes to let the court know that he or she is aware
of the proceedings and that a reliable record of the proceedings of the court is being kept.
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11. Fact Finding
Some FTOs have actually engaged in fact finding. It is not advisable for FTOs to do
so unless there are extreme discrepancies in the rendering of the facts.
The only reason that an FTO should engage in fact finding is when it is very clear that
substantial and relevant facts are missing.121 Fact finding is generally far outside the
realm of FTOs, especially in the context of a well funded court such as the ICTR.
12. Reporting
A delay in reporting could negatively affect the effectiveness of the FTO.122
Practice has shown that reports made after the culmination of a trial and the return
home of the FTO to be more effective than those made on site.123 Doing so also increases
the appearance of impartiality.124 An observer should promptly prepare his/ her report
upon the completion of the trial so that it may be submitted to the general public and the
government/ tribunal. The report should include:125
(i) the observer’s instructions;
(ii) the background of the case;
(iii) the facts of the case as revealed at trial and by independent fact finding, with
particular emphasis on the prosecution and defense evidence;
(iv) the charges, applicable laws, pre-trial procedures, trial process, judgment (if any)
and subsequent proceedings;
(v) the mental and physical condition of the defendant and the conditions of
confinement;
(vi) an evaluation of the fairness of the proceedings, applicable laws and treatment of
the defendant under national and international standards; and
(vii) a conclusion.
In addition, a report should, if possible, include the following information:
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(i)
(ii)
(iii)
(iv)

a copy of the order of the mission;
copies of relevant procedural rules, court decisions and laws;
copies of charges, transcripts and the court’s judgment;
a description of the observer’s methodology, including material studied and
persons interviewed;
(v)
sensitive material which should be omitted from the published report;
(vi)
copies of newspaper articles referring to the trial or the observer’s presence,
with the names of the newspapers and the dates of publication;
(vii) additional information not strictly within the observer’s mission (such as
information about other prisoners, other trials and recent laws); and
(viii) practical observations for the guidance of future observers.
V.

Practicality of FTOs; Problems Outside of the Realm of the Tribunal
A. Can FTOs help to protect witnesses’ rights?

While this topic is outside the realm of Fair Trial Observers, it speaks directly to
the issue of fair trials, generally.
Both the ICTY and the ICTR have had trouble ensuring the safety of witnesses.
Unlike in Nuremberg, where the Prosecutor had the meticulous records of the Nazis to
rely on, the ICTR and ICTY must rely on the testimony of witnesses to compile its
evidence.126 Neither tribunal has any mechanism in place to protect witnesses.
Witnesses fear for their own safety and for the safety of their families. Many witnesses
have declined to testify before both tribunals out of fear. Minna Schrag, a former
attorney in the Office of the Prosecutor for the ICTY believes that the, “remedy is
obvious: resources for an effective witness protection and relocation program.”127 A
relocation program, although a large undertaking, could prove invaluable to the efficacy
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of the tribunal. With a budget approaching $100,000,000,128 it seems as though a
solution to this situation may be workable.
B. Funding FTOs for the ICTR
The best way to fund FTOs would be through the United Nations. The U.N.
already has a fund set aside for trial observers; the fact that this fund and function
already exists at the U.N. should make receiving FTOs much more seamless.
It seems unlikely that NGOs would send their own observers to the ICTR absent
some egregious actions on the part of the Tribunal. While the Tribunal might risk some
appearance of bias by paying the very people who are supposed to judge how fairly the
trial is conducted, the degree of separation of the Tribunal from the U.N. should cushion
the blow somewhat.
VI. Conclusion
Regardless of the actions of the Tribunal, it will be scrutinized from many
directions. From the Nuremberg Trials to Tokyo to the ICTY it has always been so. The
ICTR has a unique opportunity to judge and improve itself without being prompted to do
so by an outside power. It is clear that the ICTY and the ICTR have taken steps to appear
as fair as possible. Nonetheless, much criticism has still been levied against the
Tribunals. By employing FTOs, the ICTR has a chance take the air out of incoming
criticism; the Tribunal can burn all of the fuel (of criticism) before anyone else can start a
fire. However, as we all know, playing with fire can get one burned. There is the
possibility that an FTO will act as the Austrian observer in the Pan Am 103 case,
referring to the entire Lockerbie trial as a ‘miscarriage of justice.’ The ICTR must weigh
the possible benefits and the likely risks that come with using FTOs in Arusha. It seems,
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from an outsider’s perspective that the possible benefits of using FTOs are well worth the
inherent risks.
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